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A  recurring  complaint  in Timothy Williamson’s  recent work  is  that  contemporary 
epistemology and philosophy of mind is prone to attempting to let justification and 
belief do work that must rather be done by knowledge. Williamson has influentially 
championed  a  ‘knowledge  first’  approach  to  these  areas  of  philosophy,  the  core 
claims  of which  are  that  knowledge  is  unanalyzable,  and  that  knowledge—rather 
than  justification, warrant,  reasonableness, or  rationality—is  the  central  and most 
important epistemic status, and knowledge—rather than belief—is the central and 
most  important  mental  state  with  mind‐to‐world  fit.  While  this  knowledge  first 








of  knowledge  maximization;  it  should  constrain  the  interpreter  to  favor 
interpretations  which  maximize  the  number  of  knowledgeable  judgments,  both 
verbalized and unverbalized, the speaker comes out as making. Williamson follows 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Lewis  in  taking  the  plight  of  the  radical  interpreter  as  dramatizing,  not  an 
epistemological question concerning how we determine facts about the contents of 
the  speech acts and attitudes of  those being  interpreted given prior knowledge of 
the  relevant  non‐intentional  facts,  but  rather  a metaphysical  question  concerning 
how  such  facts  about  content  are  determined  by  the  non‐intentional  facts  (Lewis 
1974: 333‐4, Williamson 2007: 260‐1). The principles  constraining  interpretation, 
including  the  principle  of  charity, will  be  constitutive  of  content  in  the  sense  that 
what  it  is  for  P  to  be  the  content  of  one’s  thought  is  for  P  to  be  the  content  that 
would  be  assigned  by  an  interpreter  who  is  omniscient  with  respect  to  the  non‐
intentional  facts, working  constrained by  those  principles; more  generally,  it  is  in 
virtue of these principles that one’s mental states and speech acts have the contents 
they do. Following now standard terminology,  let us call  this an  interpretationalist 
account of intentional content. 
 
According  to  this  picture,  then,  it  is  partly  in  virtue  of  a  principle  of  knowledge 
maximization that our thoughts and utterances have the contents that they do. This 
deserves  to  be  called  a  knowledge  first  approach  to  foundational  issues  in  the 
theory of content if anything does. Grappling with Williamson’s proposals provides 






pursued  here,  instead  argues  specifically  against  Williamson’s  proposed 
modification.  Adopting  this  second  strategy  may  suggest  that  I’m  broadly 
sympathetic  to  interpretationalism, and want only  to  call  into question whether  it 
stands  in  need  of  the  kind  of modification Williamson  proposes.  This  isn’t  so. My 
reason for not engaging with interpretationalism in general is not that I think it’s in 
perfectly  good  standing  as  it  is,  but  rather  that  doing  so would  be  to  engage  the 
question of the proper solution to the problems of intentionality. I will have to keep 
my  attention more  narrowly  focused  on  this  occasion.  So  here  I will  assume  that 
some  variety  of  interpretationalism  is  correct,  but  I’ll  argue  against Williamson’s 
distinctive  knowledge  first  version.  This  has  repercussions  for  the  kinds  of 
objections  to Williamson  I  can permit myself  to  raise.  In particular,  it won’t do  to 
push  the  kinds  of  worries  about  the  inscrutability  of  reference  that  some  (e.g. 
Williams  2007)  have  taken  to  cause  problems  for  interpretationalist  accounts  of 
content in general. 
 




language  content  (as  I  have  tacitly  assumed  up  until  now),  or  only  to  one  or  the 
other  of  these.  Williamson’s  discussion  suggests  that  he  envisages  the 
interpretationalist  story  applying  both  to  mental  content  and  to  public‐language 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won’t  concern  ourselves  with  questions  about  the  extent  to  which 
interpretationalism might enable one’s reductionist ambitions to be realized. 
 





sometimes  appears  to  discuss  particular  examples  in  isolation  in  a  manner  one 




just on  the grounds  that  it  fails  to match with  the verdict we are  inclined  to offer 
concerning particular  carefully  constructed  cases. One  response  that  can be made 






be  discussed  below  involve  how  to  interpret  particular  tokenings  of  the  pronoun 
‘she’  (in  thought  or  in  speech),  and  it  is  simply  assumed  that  the  interpreter  is 
charged with the task of assigning the correct referents to these tokenings. But given 
the  holistic  nature  of  interpretation,  we might  suggest  that  the  interpreter’s  task 
should rather be, in the first instance at least, that of giving the correct rule for the 
pronoun,  the  rule  that  determines  how  referents  are  assigned  given  a  context 
together  with  the  intentions  of  the  speaker.  Engaging  in  this  task  requires 
considering a wide range of different uses of  the pronoun  in question, and  it’s not 
clear on what  grounds we  can  assume  that  the  interpretation  that best meets  the 
constraints  on  interpretation  overall  with  respect  to  this  range  will  be  the 






uses  to motivate  his  proposal  just  as  readily  as  it  engages  the  examples  I  use  to 







interpretation,  unresolved.  But  for  the  purposes  of  the  present  discussion  of 
Williamson’s  view, we  can  rest  content with  adopting  the  same  assumptions  that 
condition Williamson’s own engagement with rival views.2 
 




an upshot of his  tentative suggestion  that we should replace Lewis’s  (1969, 1975) 
convention of truthfulness in a language £ with a convention of knowledgeableness 
in  £.  Unfortunately, Williamson  never  really  paused  to  spell  out  the  argument.  In 
more  recent  presentations  (2004,  2007),  the  proposal  about  conventions  has 
dropped  out  of  sight,  and  a  knowledge maximizing  principle  of  charity  is  instead 
principally motivated by the desire to mount a general response to a particular kind 
of  skeptical  challenge.  As  is  well  known,  Donald  Davidson  took  his  principle  of 
charity  to  have  anti‐skeptical  import  (1983).  For  given  a  principle  of  charity  that 
constrains  an  interpreter—even  an  omniscient  interpreter—to  maximize  true 
belief, we may conclude that beliefs of their nature tend to be veridical. Error on the 




He suggests  in one place  that  the  force of  single examples  for a holist  is  that  they can show  that a 
proposed  constraint  on  interpretation  has  implausible  consequences  concerning  which 
interpretation  is defeasibly  favored by  a  given  case  (see Williamson 2007:  265). More needs  to  be 
said to flesh this out if it’s to silence the objection, and I won’t pursue the issue further here. 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to have  an  anti‐skeptical  payload. On Williamson’s  account,  beliefs  of  their nature 
tend to constitute knowledge. So knowledge maximization  implies  that we tend to 
apply concepts correctly  in  judgment,  thereby undermining  ‘judgment skepticism’, 
according  to  which  we  systematically  misapply  everyday  concepts  such  as 
mountain,  person,  belief,  or  knowledge  in  judgment.  I  will  have  occasion  to  make 
reference  to Williamson’s  goal  of  responding  to  judgment  skepticism  later  in  the 
discussion, and it will take center‐stage in the final section. 
 




intuitively  speaking  about,  when  such  connections  are  present.  Adopting  the 
principle of knowledge maximization  is a  further step.  In section 3  I argue against 
taking this further step on the grounds that we can construct cases of determinate 
reference  where  the  principle  of  knowledge  maximization  plays  no  role,  or  even 
fails  to  be  satisfied.  I  also  argue  against  two  fallback  positions  suggested  by 










Williamson’s  argument  for  knowledge maximization  can  be  naturally  divided  into 
two  parts.  First,  he  argues  that  a  crude  principle  of  truth  maximization  leads  to 
incorrect  assignments  of  reference  since  it  ignores  the  role  played  by  causal 
connections in fixing the reference of our expressions. Second, he suggests that such 
causal  connections  are  important  in  this  regard  because  they  act  as  channels  for 
knowledge. Assignments of reference that respect these causal connections win out 
because they maximize knowledge even when they do not maximize true belief. It is 
vital  to distinguish  these  two stages  in Williamson’s  argument.  I do not doubt  the 





Against  a  crude  truth  maximizing  principle  of  charity,  Williamson  offers  the 
following  example.  Emanuel  is  mistakenly  confident  in  his  ability  to  read  off  a 















over  Celia  as  the  referent  of  the  pronoun  in  that  context.  But  that  is  a 
descriptive theory of reference gone mad. Emanuel has no beliefs about Elsie. 
He  has  many  beliefs  about  Celia,  most  of  them  false.  In  virtue  of  what  is 
Emanuel thinking about Celia rather Elsie? 
 











connected  to  the  right  objects  ‘in  the  right  way  for  reference,  whatever  that  is’ 





What  Williamson  proposes  is  a  knowledge‐based  account  of  the  significance  of 
causal  relationships,  in  the  cases  where  such  relationships  seem  important  for 
reference.  In doing  so he hopes  to offer  a more  informative  answer  than a purely 
causal story can offer to questions about what fixes what  it  is we are thinking and 
talking about, and moreover an answer that generalizes to cover cases in which we 
seem  to  have  reference  to  an  object  but  not  in  virtue  of  any  causal  relationship. 
Williamson  suggests  that  a  ‘natural  idea’  is  that  the  significance  of  the  perceptual 
link  between  Emanuel  and  Celia,  and  more  generally  the  significance  of  any 
appropriate  causal  link,  is  that  it  is  a  channel  for  knowledge,  and  so  leads  to  an 
assignment  that  maximizes  knowledge.  In  the  example  we  have  been  discussing, 
assigning Celia as the referent of Emanuel’s uses of ‘she’ in that context had Emanuel 
come out as truly accepting ‘She is standing in front of me’ and a few other claims of 




…,  true,  none  of  those  beliefs  will  amount  to  knowledge.  In  contrast,  an 
interpretation that assigns Celia as the referent of Emanuel’s uses of ‘she’ will have 














of  true  belief  maximization  might  similarly  tell  against  his  own  principle  of 
knowledge maximization, and his discussion will provide a useful point of departure 
for developing my worries with his proposal.  Suppose  that  things are  just  as  they 
were  in  the  earlier  example  in  the  following  respects;  Emanuel  is  looking  at  a 
stranger,  Celia,  and  upon  seeing  her  face  for  a  few  moments,  he  incorrectly  but 
confidently judges ‘She is F, G, H, …’, thereby ascribing a character and life‐history in 
some detail.  This  time,  however,  these descriptions not  only happen  to be  true of 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Elsie; Emanuel  is  actually acquainted with Elsie,  and happens  to know  each of  the 














The  suggestion  is  that,  contrary  perhaps  to  initial  appearances,  knowledge 
maximization doesn’t get this case wrong, since Emanuel doesn’t express knowledge 
about Elsie  even  if Elsie  is  assigned as  the  referent of  ‘she’. Even  though Emanuel 





But  it  is  natural  to  wonder  whether  the  principle  of  knowledge  maximization  is 
actually  doing  any  real work  in  producing  the  right  response  in  this  case.  Take  a 
variant of the case in which Emanuel is actually looking at a reflection of Celia. As in 
Williamson’s example, in addition to forming the judgments ‘She is F,’ ‘She is G,’ and 
so  on,  he  also  forms  the  judgment  ‘She  is  standing  in  front  of  me’,  but  no  other 
judgments of this sort. This judgment is actually false; Celia is not standing in front 
of Emanuel,  though  it appears  to him  just as  if  she was. Here  it  is natural  to  think 
that Celia is again the referent of Emanuel’s uses of ‘she’, even though the causal link 






In  building  the  variant  of  Williamson’s  examples  considered  in  the  previous 
paragraph,  I  stipulated  that  aside  from  his  judgments  detailing  a  life‐history  and 
character,  Emanuel makes  only  one  further  judgment,  namely  ‘She  is  standing  in 
front of me’. That was  important,  since  it’s  obviously  crucial  to my argument  that 
Emanuel  not  form  any  judgments  of  that  sort  that  are  knowledgeable.  Is  this  a 
legitimate stipulation? Well, perhaps not. But I’m inclined not to worry, since we can 
construct examples  in which we can afford  to  relax  such stipulations about which 










cubicle,  Jane  judges  ‘She  is beautiful’,  ‘She  is  freckled’,  ‘She has green eyes’, 
and  so  on,  keeping  her  attention  firmly  on  Helen  the  whole  time.  Each  of 
these judgments is correct.  
 
Whether  one will  agree  that  none  of  the  beliefs  Jane  comes  by  in  her  cubicle  are 
knowledgeable will depend on what one  thinks  is  required  for knowledge. But  let 
me give two considerations  in  favor of  this verdict. First,  Jane has an undercutting 
defeater  for  any  of  the  beliefs  she  forms  on  the  basis  of  perception  during  the 
duration of the trial, and so it is plausible that her beliefs cannot even be considered 
justified. Second—and perhaps more to the point given Williamson’s own views on 

















formulations  of  safety  conditions  for  knowledge  is  that  the  are  trivially  met  by 
modally‐robust  truths, most obviously necessary  truths. Suppose one guesses  that 
78 and 96 make 172. Since there’s no world in which that’s false, there’s clearly no 
nearby world  in which one  forms  that belief on a basis  relevantly  similar  to one’s 
actual basis, and yet fails to come by a true belief. But intuitively this is precisely the 
sort of case a safety condition on knowledge was meant to exclude. Safety gets the 
right  result  here,  at  least  if we  are willing  to  give  the  hedge  ‘relevantly  similar’  a 
reasonable  interpretation;  the  belief  that  78  and  96  make  171  should  count  as 
similar,  and  there  are  close  worlds  in  which  one  guesses  and  forms  this  belief 
instead  of  the  belief  that  78  and  96  make  172,  thereby  coming  by  a  false  belief 
rather  than  a  true  one.  So  formulating  our  safety  condition  on  knowledge  as 
  16
something  like  Safety  provides  a  neat  way  of  solving  this  familiar  problem  with 
modally‐robust truths (Sainsbury 1997, Weatherson 2004, Pritchard 2009).3  
 
The  relevance of  all  this  to our discussion of Hallucinogen  is  this.  If  ‘she’  refers  to 
Helen,  then  there  are  no  close  worlds  in  which  Jane  forms  the  belief  she  would 











false.  Of  course,  under  certain  assumptions  these  conditions  are  equivalent,  but 
those are assumptions one cannot make in the present context. It is quite natural to 
think  that Safety  fails  in Hallucinogen,  not because  Jane would  form  false  beliefs  if 
she shifted her attention, but because the pronouns she would employ would fail to 














So  I  think  it’s  very  plausible  that  none  of  the  beliefs  Jane  forms  in  this  case  are 
knowledgeable.  One  can  resist  this  conclusion  by  maintaining  that  one  can  have 
knowledge even if one has an undercutting defeater and fails Safety, but that will be 





any  less  of  a  spare  gear  in Williamson’s  Emanuel  case  and  the  variants  we  have 
considered? 
 
One  might  suggest  that  Williamson  doesn’t  really  need  to  appeal  to  knowledge 










It  doesn’t  look  like  this  proposal  entails  the  principle  of  knowledge maximization 
and  so  it  is  worth  detaching  it  from  that  principle  and  considering  it  as  an 
independent  claim  about  the  significance  of  causal  connections,  when  they  are 
present.  But  even  with  the  prefixed  hedge,  Williamson’s  claim  is  too  strong. 
Consider again the case Hallucinogen. The causal connection between Jane’s uses of 
‘she’  and  Helen  is  plausibly  a  channel  for  reference,  but  this  connection  is  not  a 
channel for the acquisition of knowledge about Helen. The argument for this is just 
the  one  offered  above.  This  objection  leaves  intact  the  plausible  thought  that  a 
causal connection is a channel for the acquisition of knowledge about an object only 
if  it  is  a  channel  for  reference  to  that  object.  But  I  think  that  the  above  example 
shows  that  it  is  not  even  roughly  true  that  a  causal  connection  is  a  channel  for 
reference to an object only if it is a channel for the acquisition of knowledge about 
that  object.  So  I  think  that  a  knowledge  first  account  of  the  significance  of  causal 







case  in  which  one  is  simultaneously  attending  to  two  qualitatively  identical 
candidates  that one’s  thought  ‘That  is pink’  could be about,  and where one would 
express  knowledge  whichever  candidate  was  assigned  as  the  referent  of  ‘that’. 
Martin’s  thought  is  that one could still have a thought about the object on the  left, 










of  lefty  rather  than  righty.  It  does  not  matter  whether  that  knowledge 
includes the particular item that it is pink, for the thought ‘That is pink’ still 
has a compositional semantics. Even if no knowledge actually happens to be 




We might adapt  this  response  to  the case  I offered above; Helen  is  the referent of 
Jane’s  uses  of  ‘she’  in  virtue  of  a  causal  connection  that  would  be  a  channel  to 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knowledge  in  counterfactual  cases.  I  confess  that  I  don’t  see  how  to  construct  a 
counterexample  to  this  weaker  claim.  But  the  proposed  connection  between 
reference  and  knowledge  seems  so  diluted  that  it  is  unclear what  significance we 
should attach to it, even if it holds; it is unclear why one couldn’t happily admit the 
connection without holding that there’s a particularly intimate connection between 
reference  and  knowledge,  or  conceding  any  major  victory  to  knowledge  first 
philosophy. We can make  this a  little more pointed.  In  section one  I noted  that  in 
Williamson’s  recent  discussions  of  knowledge  maximization  he  is  concerned  to 
undermine  judgment  skepticism  by  showing  that  beliefs  of  their  nature  tend  to 
constitute knowledge, and thereby tend to be true. We’ll examine this line of thought 
in  more  detail  in  section  4  below.  But  the  point  for  just  now  is  that  the  revised 
principle suggested by Williamson’s reply to Martin doesn’t have this anti‐skeptical 
consequence.  For  the  revised  principle  only  makes  being  a  potential  channel  for 
knowledge a necessary  condition on being  a  channel  for  reference,  and  so  it  does 
not  generate  a  presumption  that  our  beliefs  are  actually  knowledgeable  or  true. 
There’s a danger, then, that revised proposal fails to engage the judgment skeptic. Of 
course, by itself this doesn’t have any tendency to show that the revised proposal is 














of  constitutive  link  between  reference  and  knowledge,  but  none  of  the  three 
suggested  by  Williamson’s  discussion  have  proved  promising,  and  I  don’t  see 
grounds to be optimistic that any intimate connection of the sort Williamson wants 
will  emerge.  This  leaves  defenders  of  interpretationalist  accounts  of  content with 
the related challenges of explaining the significance of causal connections when they 






Judgment  skepticism  has  been  mentioned  at  several  junctures  throughout  our 
discussion, and I want to close by considering the import of the conclusions of the 
last section  for our engagement with such a  skeptic. The  judgment skeptic attacks 
                                                                                                                                                                     
channel  for  the  acquisition  of  knowledge  so  long  knowledge  is  acquired  via  its  tokens  in  normal 
cases. That’s compatible with Hallucinogen,  if we grant both that it’s an abnormal case, and that the 
token causal connection  in  the example  is a  token of a  type  that  is a channel  for knowledge,  in  the 
proposed sense. It’s not at all clear that my objection in the text to Williamson’s own version of the 
fallback  applies with  the  same  degree  of  force  here;  perhaps  a  presumption  is  generated  that  our 
beliefs  are  normally  knowledgeable,  and perhaps we  should  allow  that  this would  be  a  significant 





or  whether  we  have  enabled  ourselves  to  say  something  more  informative  about  which  causal 
connection tokens are reference relations only by assuming we have an independent grasp on which 









psychological  ascriptions  of  belief  and  desire,  Paul  Churchland  and  other 
eliminativists  about  such mental  states  are  judgment  skeptics.  In  a  context 
that  concerns  ordinary  geographical  judgments,  Terry  Horgan  and  other 
eliminativists about mountains are judgment skeptics. Such skeptics question 
our  standards  for  applying  ordinary  concepts  both  in  experience  and 
thought:  the  concept  of  a  mountain,  the  concept  of  belief,  the  concept  of 
knowledge,  the  concept  of  possibility,  the  concept  of  the  counterfactual 
conditional, and so on. 
 
Williamson  claims  that,  like  more  familiar  skeptics,  judgment  skeptics  argue  for 
their  position  by  presenting  skeptical  scenarios—scenarios  in  which most  of  our 
judgments about  some contextually  relevant  subject matter are  false but  in which 
there  is some story about how we understandably come to make those  judgments 
despite  their  falsity—and  challenge  us  to  find  grounds  for  continuing  to  regard 
those judgments as true (Williamson 2007: 221‐2). But why think this challenge is 
any  more  worrying  that  that  presented  by  the  skeptic  about,  say,  perception? 
Williamson suggests (2007: 250‐1) that the reason that judgment skepticism merits 
special  consideration  is  that  a  case  can  be  made  for  thinking  that  the  kinds  of 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scenarios  the  judgment  skeptic  plays  with  may  well  be  instantiated  by  other 
cultures in the actual world (or at  least  in nearby worlds), whereas skeptics about 
perception  invoke modally  remote  scenarios  involving  brains  in  vats  or  extended 
and  coherent  dreams.  So we  cannot  dismiss  the  judgment  skeptic’s  arguments  on 











tend to be knowledgeable. And since knowledge  is  factive,  this  implies  that beliefs 
tend to be true, just as Davidson held. This applies not only to our own beliefs, but 
also  those  of  geographically  and  modally  proximate  believers.  So  a  successful 
defense  of  knowledge  maximization  would  put  us  in  a  position  to  dismiss  the 
judgment  skeptic’s  scenarios  once  and  for  all.  Not  only would we  have  assurance 
that we are not prone  to error on  the scale envisaged by some  judgment skeptics, 








label  ‘judgment  skepticism’.  The  first  is  a  kind  of  skepticism  about  a  class  of 
judgments that contends that since the judgments of members of other cultures or 
our past  selves  are  or were wrong, we have no  right  to  think  that  our  judgments 
about the relevant subject matter get things right (and perhaps even have inductive 
reasons  to  think  that  they  too are  false—this kind of pessimistic  induction  is very 
familiar from ethics, the philosophy of religion, and the philosophy of science).  
 
The  second  is  the  repudiation of  a  certain  class of objects,  typically  leading  to  the 




beliefs,  desires,  and  mental  states,  is  a  moribund  theory;  it  is  explanatorily 
inadequate  even  when  one  favorably  chooses  its  domain  of  applicability  and  it 
coheres remarkably poorly with our best scientific theories. From this he concludes 
that we  should be  eliminativists  about mental  states. According  to Horgan  (1995) 
                                                        





can  (strictly  speaking,  at  least)  be  no  vague  objects,  mountains  included.  Plainly 




Once  we  tease  apart  these  two  broad  kinds  of  challenges  to  common‐sense,  it 
becomes very hard to see how appealing to knowledge maximization is supposed to 
help  speak  to  either.  Presumably  we  want  to  be  able  to  say  that  nothing  in  the 
nature of intentional content prevents our past selves or other cultures from having 




to  traditional skeptical arguments, and Williamson argues at  length  that  this gives 
us reason to be very suspicious; it is very difficult to see how such arguments could 
apply  selectively  against  particular  targets,  and  we  are  confident  that  these 
                                                        
7 Williamson recognizes a role for naturalness, of the sort familiar from Lewis 1974 and elsewhere, in 
determining  the  reference  relation,  and  he  suggests  that  this  ‘holds  the  anti‐skeptical  effect  of 









arguments  cannot  be  sound  in  general.  This  point  is  perhaps  well  taken,  but 
whether or not it is, it seems completely independent of knowledge maximization.  
 
On  the  other  hand,  arguments  like  those  presented  by  Churchland  and  Horgan 
surely deserve and need to be addressed head on. Neither Churchland nor Horgan 
relies on a  style of  argument  that bears  any  significant  resemblance  to  traditional 
arguments for skepticism, and so we cannot simply dismiss their arguments on the 
grounds  that we can be confident  there  is a mistake somewhere. Williamson does 
stress  that  we  need  to  judge  arguments  that  do  not  turn  on  ‘general  skeptical 
fallacies’ on their own merits (2007: 241). But  it doesn’t seem like Williamson has 
Horgan and Churchland’s arguments  in mind here. Rather, he  seems  to  take  these 
philosophers to be offering skeptical arguments. He cites Horgan and van Inwagen’s 
claim that there are no mountains as an example of the kind of  ‘skeptical scenario’ 
employed  by  judgment  skeptics  (2007:  221‐2),  though  he  notes  that  unlike more 




microphysical  events  the  human  brain  usefully  but  untruthfully  classifies  as 
mountains,  and  concludes  that we  cannot  know  and  are  not  justified  in  believing 
that  there  are  mountains’  (2007:  225‐6).  There’s  no  sharp  distinction  drawn  in 




not  justified  in  believing’  that  things  are  as  common  sense  says  they  are,  and  the 




I  suspect  that  it  is  only  by  failing  to  sharply  distinguish  the  kind  of  arguments 
offered by Churchland and Horgan from the skeptical arguments one finds directed 
against the claim that our present religious, ethical and scientific beliefs are justified 















may  frequently  hold  out  hostages  that  cannot  be  redeemed.8  Only  a  careful 
examination of the most powerful arguments for skepticism will reveal whether this 
is  a possibility  that need cause proponents of knowledge  first philosophy genuine 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